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Left-of-center parties are rhetorically against liberalizing markets, but historical 
evidence proves otherwise under certain circumstances.  The United States is vitally 
interested in the democratic and economic success of developing countries, as stated in 
United States national security strategy. This thesis uses economic institutionalism to 
examine the occasions on which left-of-center presidents successfully implemented 
neoliberal economic reforms.  Case studies of Chile under President Patricio Aylwin and 
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The wave of democratization in Latin America has been accompanied by a wave 
of neoliberal reforms, some successful and others not.  The United States of America is 
vitally interested in the economic stability of Latin America. Once thought to be a 
breeding ground for communism, Latin America is now a regional partner seeking 
economic growth.  The effects of economic instability in this region, once limited to Wall 
Street or Washington in the form of prices for produce or industrial jobs, can now be seen 
on the street corners of Seattle, Charleston, or even Bismarck, North Dakota. This is not 
an argument in favor of globalization, but a tangible and realistic view of how 
interrelated the Western Hemisphere has become.  Visionaries of the past signed and 
passed NAFTA, paving the way for continued bi-lateral free trade agreements and 
ultimately a FTAA.  After the ideological barriers against free-market economics lessen, 
the countries in Latin America become more receptive to necessary reform policies.   
Market-oriented policies became extremely popular in the ‘80s, according to Dani 
Rodrik, a political economist for Columbia University, after two significant events.1  
First was the popularity, then failure, of import-substitutions policies, and second was the 
success of the ‘Asian Tigers’, whose market-oriented policies led to significant economic 
growth.2 Once the light switch for probable economic growth was turned on, the next 
step has become overcoming political and domestic barriers.  The examples of market 
success are easy to identify on the system level; however, real success occurs in the 
implementation and outcomes from economic reforms within the black box. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the actors, preferences, and institutions 
that give rise to democratically elected left-of-center executives who can also 
successfully carry out free-market reforms. In the past, political leaders in Latin America 
demonstrated a cultural and institutional propensity toward state-centric economic 
policies such as import controls, overvalued exchange rates, public ownership of major 
                                                 
1 Market-oriented policies uses Adam Przeworski definition.  Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the 
Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge:Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 136. 
1 
2 Dani, Rodrik, “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 24, 
(March 1996): 12. 
enterprises, and price controls.  Import substitution industrialization is the leading 
example of state-centric economic policies which sought to escape the dependence on 
unpredictable world markets through government-led industrialization3.  Another 
example of a state-centric economic policy was Peru’s ‘heterodox program’ instituted by 
the Garcia administration in 1985.  The Garcia program tried to force an increase in real 
wages and consumption by freezing prices and interest rates, and by creating public 
works programs which were unsustainable, causing severe domestic current-account 
deficit and hyperinflation.4  State-centric economic policies were legitimized by 
prominent economists like Raul Prebisch, who argued for structural change to those 
countries on the periphery,5 and later by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his dependency 
theory.6  
It is not the purpose of this thesis to document the advantage of neoliberal 
economic policies over state-centric policies.  Rather, it seeks to explain the continuing 
implementation of neoliberal economic policies by left-wing presidents, whose political 
campaign victories are achieved on diametrically opposite economic strategies.  Some 
scholars focus on the pragmatic domestic political reasons for the change, while others 
emphasize the immense economic influence of the United States and sympathetic 
international institutions as the driving force behind widespread neoliberalism.  This 
thesis will incorporate facets of both ideas by using an institutionalist approach.   
 
A. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
1. Under What Conditions Do Democratically Elected Left-wing 
Governments Successfully Carry Out Free-Market Reforms? 
                                                 
3 Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege, “Import Substitution Industrialization,” in Modern Political 
Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy, ed. Jeffry Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr., and Michael Tomz 
(Boulder: Westview, 2000) 155. 
4 Dani Rodrik, “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Modern Political Economy and Latin 
America: Theory and Policy, ed. Jeffry Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr., and Michael Tomz (Boulder: Westview, 
2000) 
5  Ibid., 155 
6 Fernando Henrique, Cardoso and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America, 
translated by Marjory, Mattingly Urquidi, Siglo Veintiuno editors, SA, 1971; reprint, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1979. 
2 
Historical evidence shows that democratically elected left-wing presidents will 
institute market reforms, under the influence of international and domestic actors.  This 
influence supports dismantling barriers to reforms, dependent on the interests and 
preferences of the actors.  While left-wing presidents do demonstrate agency in this 
process, institutions shape the process by which market-oriented reforms occur.  
Institutions are best defined by Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor as “the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy.”7  
 
B. METHODOLOGY  
This paper will investigate how these elected heads of state implement free-
market reforms and overcome obstacles created by domestic institutions, as well as 
examine the interaction between the executive and legislative branches of government 
and political parties. This paper will also examine international actors’ influence on 
domestic actors and institutions that facilitate neoliberal economic reform.   
The ability for left-wing presidents to institute neoliberal reforms is most 
effectively explained by ‘rational institutionalism’ or ‘political economy.’8  This 
approach is deductive in nature, beginning with the policies and then analyzing the 
institutions that were created and used.  These institutional frameworks created by the 
social aggregation of actors can be characterized as winning majority or power over any 
opposition procedures or routines.  Procedures that are either under the table or merely 
informal norms of arrangements could be more efficient and cost too much to change.  
An important part of political economy is that actors are rational and the key to policy 
implementation is found in the details. 
Rational actors seek to maximize their benefits with the least amount of cost, and 
as long as the benefits outweigh the cost policies are held in a favorable light.  Barbara 
Geddes best sums up the approach of what people assume and thus how they make 
rational determinations: “first, choose the means they consider most likely to result in 
                                                 
7 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Talyor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 
Political Studies (1996), XLIV, 938 
8 Hall, 945 
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desired ends; second, can weakly order their goals (that is, given any set of alternatives, 
they will prefer one or the other or be indifferent); third, hold consistent preferences.”9  
Rational actors are not limited to individuals but also include organizations that are able 
to identify specific preferences.  Both Geddes and Frieden refer to the rational-choice 
approach as “methodological individualism,” however, this author agrees with Frieden’s 
interpretation that self-interests alone do not explain social outcome.  It is the logical 
analysis of basic entities (and their preferences) and their interaction which produce 
policies.10 The advantage of institutionalism or political economy methodology over 
strictly cost-benefit analysis is found in the details.  Merely assigning numerical values or 
statistical interpretations of institutions overlook the human factor needed for success.  
Human factors ignored include informal procedures, interest aggregation, or historical 
analogies, to name a few.  Just because the constitution of a country spells out procedure 
if benefits of informal channels exist, it is likely those avenues of least resistance will be 
the most effective.   
Presidents, legislators, judges, political parties, and NGOs are actors whose 
interests and preferences are to maximize their utility.  Actors will aggregate their 
preferences or seek a compromise when the possible outcome is in their favor or mutually 
detrimental.  Aggregation and compromise are situational and could be seen as either a 
cost or benefit dependent upon the actor’s preferences.  The most helpful example of 
interest aggregation could be found in a legislature that contains multiple political parties 
without one simple majority.  In this scenario, political parties will aggregate and 
compromise to form a coalition that possesses a majority.  This is seen in Chile in 1989 
after political parties and national elections were authorized again, resulting in the 
majority of the left-wing parties from Christian-Democrats to Socialists collating their 
influence to win the presidency.  The costs of cooperation were much less than the 
benefit of a presidential victory, but how does one place values on it?  Cost-benefit 
analysis reduces the details and sacrifices of individual parties to utter simplicity.  What 
                                                 
9 Barbara Geddes, “Uses and Limitations of Rational Choice,” Latin America in Comparative 
Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis,” ed. Peter H. Smith, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1995, 83. 
10 Jeffry Frieden, “The Method of Analysis: Modern Political Economy,” Modern Political Economy 
Theory and Latin America: Theory and Policy, ed. Jeffry Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr., and Michael Tomz, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 38. 
4 
was missed was the immediate creation of many institutions created by the Concertacion 
which are ever-evolving as special interests come to the forefront of polity.  
This paper has a minor selection bias through its focus on the presidency as the 
source of weak opposition to trade liberalization.  Presidents could suffer from historical 
analogies or cognitive inhibitions to change or maintain the status quo.  Before World 
War I, Latin American markets were very open and liberal to Europe and the United 
States.  However, very restrictive trade policies by the super-powers at war forced the 
developing world to seek their own market protection.  The once-reliable imports were 
gone as well as the export market, forcing Latin America as a whole to create barriers of 
trade for revenue or governmental control over industrialization and successful export 
industries or commodities.  This example could be a source of historical analogy for a 
president, which though unquantifiable by cost-benefit analysis is evident by the actions 
and arrangements made by an executive. 
In Brazil President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is best known for diametrically 
political-economic positions.  In his early years he wrote for local communist papers and 
generated a Marxist appreciation for politics common among scholars and students.  His 
associations with leftists were not a secret and it forced him into exile 1964-1968, after a 
coup d’etat.  While in exile, Cardoso wrote his most influential book, entitled 
Dependency and Development in Latin America, co-authored with Enzo Faletto, a young 
Chilean social scientist. This book coined the dependency theory emphasizing the 
dispersion of economic centers (first-world) and the periphery (third-world or developing 
countries) and how they depended on one another for status quo.  This theory denounced 
trade liberalization as a country’s social mobility, and in fact saw it as a source of 
restraint to keep the economically dominant center in control.  These obvious and well-
documented political positions make Brazil under Cardoso an obvious choice for a case 
study. 
 Political journals, works on international relations and political economy, 
periodicals, and government political services will serve as the sources of information.  
Secondary sources that include interviews are vital when investigating how actors group 





Institutionalism is an excellent tool for demonstrating how market-oriented 
reforms are successfully turned into policy, but the main question in this paper is why a 
left-of-center president would want to employ such reforms.  This is can be viewed as a 
circle of action between the president, the lawmakers, the public and all other actors in 
between.  The actors are linked by institutions, thereby giving each actor two options of 
policy: to be the action originator (instigator) or the reactor.  A president will either move 
forward with his/her policy agenda within the institutions or become part of the 
institutional process instigated by another’s preferences. 
Dani Rodrik writes of two pillars upon which the new orthodoxy is founded: first 
the example of the Asian tigers, and second the tried and failed policy of Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI).11  Rudiger Dornbusch argues that the flood of 
liberalization stems from four factors: failed state-centric policies, poor economic 
performance, exposure to globalization and the increase in information, and World Bank 
pressure and evidence of success.12  Trade liberalization or free-market reforms appear to 
be very pragmatic in origin, ignoring the significance of left-wing executive influence.  
However, pragmatic causes for market-oriented reforms embody the essence of what this 
paper is trying to demonstrate; that neoliberalism can exist under a left-of-center 
president.  This is the basis for the first assumption of this paper; that market 
liberalization is beneficial to a country encouraging economic growth. 
It is difficult to systematically identify and single out a specific trade policy that 
leads to growth; however, John Williamson had compiled a useful list of policies known 
as the ‘Washington Consensus’ delineating free-market reforms.  The case studies will 
use Williamson’s ten areas of policy reform as the criteria for successful market-oriented 
                                                 
11 Rodrik, “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature,13 
12 Rudiger Dornbusch, “The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Winter 1992), 69-70. 
6 
reforms: (1) fiscal discipline, (2) public expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) 
financial liberalization, (5) exchange rates, (6) trade liberalization, (7) foreign direct 
investment, (8) privatization, (9) deregulation, (10) property rights.13 The consensus is 
well known for its checklist-style determination of first-generation neoliberal economic 
reforms. This thesis is not trying to make a caricature of the Washington Consensus, but 
use its insight and simplicity as guidelines for examining the following case studies.   
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARIES  
1. Importance 
The first chapter of this paper is a thorough examination of the importance of 
analyzing left-of-center presidents who are rhetorically against liberalizing markets, but 
recent historical evidence proves otherwise in certain situations.  The United States is 
vitally interested in the democratic and economic success of developing countries, as 
stated in United States National Security Strategy, Sections VI and VII.  Latin America is 
generally portrayed as a continent of developing countries; coupled with its proximity to 
the United States, Latin American economic success is of national interest for the sake of 
democracy, regional stability, and security.   
The President of the United States’ National Security Strategy highlights the 
importance in economic growth of developing countries and expanding free trade 
throughout the world published in sections VI and VII.  Section VI is titled “Ignite a New 
Era of Global Economy Through Free-markets and Free Trade”, and Section VII is 
“Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure 
of Democracy.”  This paper examines a possible unstable environment in Latin America 
for democracy and liberal markets as a result of political swings to the left in recent 
presidential elections in Latin America, which raise the concerns of U. S. investors and 
policy-makers over regional stability.  However, a better understanding in the occurrence 
of market reforms by left-of-center presidents will prove to be very beneficial to U.S. 
policy makers.  Once fully developed, these hypotheses could prove to be a useful tool 
                                                 
13 John Williamson, the Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America, (Institute for International 
Economics: Washington, D.C., 1990), 9-31. 
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for multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and any other actors 
whose economic investments are affected by the politics of heads of states. 
 
2. Chilean Case Study 
President Aylwin successfully implemented free-market reforms even though they 
were not his preferences.  However, the ability for Chile to retain the previous regime’s 
reforms is just as important as forwarding the reform process.  Aylwin’s economic 
preferences were distracted by the transition back to democracy, Pinochet remaining as 
Commander of the Army, and the political strength of right-wing congressmen pacifying 
any success in constitutional or legislative reforms.  This distraction was also evident to 
the international actors who showed minimal concerns with the direction of the Chilean 
markets; however, the distraction led to maintaining the newly formed status quo.   
The economic liberal policies were credited to Pinochet and his technocrats, the 
“Chicago Boys,” overcast the success of President Aylwin’s administration.  President 
Aylwin defeated a powerful self-appointed president under a weak and loosely developed 
political ticket.  As president his administrations choose to operate under the established 
institutional framework, and make changes within the same context.  This framework 
limited his autonomy, highlighted by the Interministrial Committee on the Economy 
insulation, led by the finance minister Foxely, which administered the executive branch 
of the government public policy.  These institutions generated new frameworks, and 
Aylwin choices facilitated continued economic reform both directly and indirectly. 
 
3. Brazilian Case Study 
Brazil under Fernando Henrique Cardoso successfully implemented first-
generation neoliberal reforms, as outlined in the ‘Washington Consensus.’ This chapter 
summarizes the critical issues that faced Cardoso during his second term in office, issues 
historical and contemporary.   
The Brazil chapter will highlight Cardoso’s past and a lethargic legislature as 
opposition to economic reform.  However, Real Plan and opening state monopolies on 
petroleum, telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas are examples of Cardoso 
8 
successfully implementing reforms.  However, Cardoso also failed to implement some 
reforms.  Inequality, hyperinflation, monetary policies for generating growth, lack of 
proportional education funding, and the inefficient enigma of a social security system are 
the critical issues that not only plagued Cardoso, but continued into Lula’s presidency.   
A unique difference between the Brazil case study and Chile is the role of the 
president as an instigator or inhibitor to reform, hence, the need to consider both 
environments and avoid the ‘black box’ labeling.  In identifying the institutions within 
the black box the paper can unravel some secrets to neoliberalism success, regardless of 





























II. CHAPTER TWO: US NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
ECONOMIC REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 
As Richmond M. Lloyd states, “national interests are the ’wellspring’ in which 
national objectives and grand strategy flow.”14    The National Security Strategy under 
the George W. Bush administration is pillared upon economic prosperity and liberty of 
the developed world, defense of the homeland, and promotion of democratic values.  
Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, every administration is required to generate a 
schedule of security interests that are nationally important, or national strategic objectives 
that address U.S. threats.   
Economic growth and prosperity is not a new strategic objective. Arguably it 
could be traced back to Wilsonian ideology of spreading democracy for the benefit of 
those without it, or maybe further.  However, the historical sequence of spreading 
economic prosperity to the globe is not on trial; under deliberation is its continued 
importance on a national level in light of recent events.  The loss of the World Trade 
Center, the War on Terrorism, war in Iraq, and furthering a policy of preemptive military 
intervention are high political items, but what elevates the economic growth of 
developing countries into high politics? Condoleezza Rice writes that the National 
Security Strategy is founded on three pillars, the last of which is to “extend peace by 
extending prosperity and freedom throughout the globe.”15  This chapter ties together 
regional economic policy and U.S. strategic objectives.  
This chapter intends to demonstrate its importance and the relevance of studying 
neoliberal reforms in a national security affairs curriculum by dissecting the most current 
National Security Strategy and its applicability to Latin America.  Specifically the NSS 
emphasizes free trade and improving the developing world in two chapters: Section VI is 
titled “Ignite a New Era of Global Economy through Free-markets and Free Trade;” and 
Section VII is “Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the 
                                                 
14 Richmond M. Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework,” Strategy and Force Planning 
Faculty, eds., Strategy and Force Planning, 3rd ed. (Newport, Rhode Island: Navy War College, 2000) 5. 
 15  Condoleezza Rice, “The Balance of Power that Favors Freedom” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, an 
electronic journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol 7, Number 4, 5 
11 
Infrastructure of Democracy.”  The argument is that economic growth of developing 
countries through free trade agreements strengthens states, preventing weak or failed 
states. Strong and stable states, in turn, minimize civil unrest and encourage foreign 
support and the opinion of all things American. 
Washington believes that left-of-center presidents compromise U.S. security 
strategy.  This thesis demonstrates otherwise, using Chile and Brazil as empirical 
examples.  What is the grand Washington design for economic growth in the developing 
world?  It is free trade and free-markets.  This paper establishes the philosophy and 
pragmatic reasons for which U.S. national security strategy supports developing 
countries’ prosperity.    
  
A. WHY THE U.S. SUPPORTS LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 
Why is Latin America’s economic prosperity important to the U.S. National 
Security Strategy?  Developing countries which do not have the infrastructure or 
institutions to manage internal security or monitor imports of terror are possible breeding 
grounds for terrorists, insurgents, or revolutionaries.  Without sustained development, 
developing countries could easily become unstable, undemocratic, or turn into a failed 
state, all of which are detrimental to U.S. interests, citizens, and territory.   
Economic growth encourages compromise, political stability, and democracy, and 
inhibits popular support for terrorist organizations.  The United States National Security 
Strategy prescribes supporting international peace by extending the benefits of prosperity 
and liberty.  The answer sounds too simple: that through the spread of democracy, 
personal liberties, and open-markets, prosperity will ensue and international peace will be 
supported. A “paradigm of progress” has emerged among the developed and developing 
countries of the world that share a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, a market-
based economy, and open trade.  16 
 
 
                                                 
 16 Condoleezza Rice, “The Balance of Power that Favors Freedom” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, an 
electronic journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol 7, Number 4, 7 
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B. ANALYZING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FROM AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
Seize the global initiative.  This is a declaration of proactive U.S. nature, seeking 
trade agreements and actively using institutions and organizations like the WTO and IMF 
to further U.S.-led world growth.  This endeavor does not amend U.S. policies or 
attention toward Latin America 
Press regional initiatives. NAFTA has been a success and has withstood the 
border-tightening since 9/11.  The NSS designates 2005 as the goal date for establishing a 
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.  This objective is not candidly offered, because 
of the historical precedent set by NAFTA, which was once thought to be unmanageable, 
yet prevailed.  “A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing 
prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.”17 Free trade on a global level must begin 
with regional blocks, and these coalitions with interdependent markets will lead to 
continued interdependence beyond trade into such important issues as security.  
Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements.  The U.S. has specifically 
targeted Chile as its next bi-lateral free trade partner, but also set its sights on countries in 
Central America.  It is believed that with more bi-lateral trade agreements the goal of 
creating FTAA becomes more fathomable. 
Renew the executive-congressional partnership.  This was a common problem in 
the U.S. administration, which would hold up trade promotions by requiring a consensus 
in congress as well as Presidential go-ahead.  This has supposedly been streamlined to 
negotiations with developing countries by the Trade Act of 2002, which lack time, 
infrastructure, and depth of resources to wait on U.S. bureaucracy.  
Promote the connection between trade and development.  This objective tries to 
encourage established institutions like the WTO to remain flexible for poorer countries.  
The Caribbean basin is a target of this initiative, tying public health and the most basic 
needs conditional to trade pacts. However, these conditionalities would be subsidized by 
the U.S.  The precedent for this is set by the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. 
                                                 
17 The National Security Strategy, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, 21. 
13 
Enforce trade agreements and laws against unfair practices. Enforcement is an 
ideal easily corrupted by powerful lobby groups.  Still, it is a commitment and the U.S. 
addresses these claims of trade impropriety to recognized institutions like the WTO.  
NAFTA has an internal judiciary body to handle agreement clarifications or violations.  It 
is necessary for all participants in a free trade coalition to bind themselves to the virtue of 
enforcing trade agreements and laws, which does not negate confusion or mistakes, but it 
does coerce all parties to communicate and agree to a mediating or arbitrating forum.  
Help domestic industries and workers adjust.  This statute is most evident in the 
steel industry, where safeguards are in place so that ‘benefits to free trade do not come at 
the expense of American worker.”  This is an area of great contention, especially after the 
previous declaration of intolerance toward unfair practices.  The “expense of American 
workers,” can easily be an excuse used by a Latin American country. This irony or 
hypocrisy will be addressed later.  
Protect the environment and workers.  This article generates potential barriers to 
free trade, as was witnessed during the NAFTA negotiations.  The country with higher 
emission and labor standards tend to lose comparative advantage, but this article tries to 
level the playing field. 
Enhance energy security.  Alan Larson, the Undersecretary of State for Economic, 
Business and Agricultural Affairs, is most concerned with the expanding reliable sources 
of energy, transport security, and terrorism finances in easing the impact of economic 
shock.  Latin America is best poised to provide for U.S. demand of a reliable steady 
supply of energy without benefiting any terrorist organization.  This is sought by 
spreading the oil resources away from strictly Middle Eastern origins.  Latin America 
plays a strategic role in stabilizing the global market by providing a higher percentage of 
energy resources.  The percentage of oil the U.S. received from Venezuela and Mexico 
has increased over the last few years and is in keeping with the NSS to stabilize against 
economic shocks 
Alan P. Larson gives a good summary of the comprehensive strategy. 
“Economic strength and resiliency are the foundation of our 
national security. The economic dimension of the National Security 
Strategy focuses on three priorities:  First, we must assure economic 
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security by making the U.S. and global economies more resilient to 
economic shocks.  Second, we must advance a global prosperity agenda 
by expanding trade and investment between nations.  Third, we need to 
ensure poor nations participate fully in the rising tide of prosperity.”18 
 
Not once in the comprehensive strategy for free trade was security mentioned 
except for energy.  How does this relate to external threats, terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking, or weapons of mass destruction?  This is the foundation of Article VI of the 
National Security Strategy, which begs the question, where does it apply or relate to 
security?  The U.S. cannot address the threats of terrorism without a global coalition 
which is strengthened by the prosperity and growth of developing countries.19  Focusing 
on Latin America, the rest of this paper will address the potential security benefits that 
are associated with free trade alliances, as well possible downsides.   
 
C. LATIN AMERICAN REALITIES 
U.S.-Latin American relations have not always been grounded on good intentions.  
However, contemporary perceptions toward U.S. security have created a paradigm shift 
that recognizes the importance of economic prosperity paralleling and bolstering U.S. 
national interests.  This elevates economic growth into “high politics” and Latin America 
is strategically poised to symbiotically gain from U.S. strategic polices.  “As economic 
policy and market relations further push traditional strategic policy off center stage and 
modify diplomatic affairs, will regional security be weakened or strengthen?”20 
Starting with President George Bush in 1990 in announcing the Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative, economic and democratic stability throughout Latin America became 
the modus operandi for U.S.-Latin American relations during the 1990s.  The end of the 
Cold War and an end to U.S. fears about Soviet intentions in the region facilitated this 
evolution. 
                                                 
 18 Alan, P Larson.  “Economic Priorities of the National Security Strategy” U.S. Foreign Policy 
Agenda, vol. 7, no. 4: 19 
19 Larson, 21. 
 20 Georges A. Fauriol foreword to Patrice M. Franko, Toward a New Security Architecture in the 
Americas: the Strategic Implications of FTAA (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2000), X. 
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This trend to regionalize free trade and create market coalitions in Latin America 
was partially led by U.S. initiatives, and has found support in Latin America.  NAFTA 
preceded MERCOSUR, which was followed by the Caribbean Free Trade Area.  
Currently, the U.S. is continuing toward bi-lateral free trade agreements as well as a 
hemispheric Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.  Integrating the Western 
Hemisphere into a free-market coalition will encourage each country to collectively 
address issues that cross borders, such as international security threats, proliferation, 
terrorism, immigration and environmental protection, to become regional or hemispheric 
issues.  Strengthening the economic ties of regional trading blocs will strengthen 
multilateral issues. Where once security issues were dealt with across borders and tended 
to be the other countries’ responsibility, Countries will now be forced to take ownership 
of internal security issues to maintain the status quo created by the coalition. 
Patrice Franko, a political economist at Colby College in Waterville, Maine 
believes, “Improvements in economic relations in the hemisphere were clearly seen as an 
opener to broader partnerships throughout the region to tackle tough transnational issues 
such as terrorism and counter-narcotics.”21  The terrorists who flew the airliners into the 
World Trade Center, Pentagon, and that Pennsylvania field were not poor and did not live 
in squalor, “but when nations fail to meet the most basic needs of their people these failed 
states become havens for terror.”22 It is difficult not to draw a tangent from this subject, 
but this paper’s focus is on highlighting the U.S. security benefit from the economic 
growth of developing countries.  Free trade agreements between developed and 
developing countries require the developed country to carry the brunt of the 
administrative and infrastructure burdens of the agreement, while the latter makes 
economic, cultural, and environmental sacrifices that often inhibit comparative 
advantages.  This cooperation translates to a different level of trade, one beyond the plan 
of industry and commodities, to human and cultural capital transactions. 
Ensure poor nations participate fully in the rising tide of prosperity.  Larson 
concisely states that, “Capital is a coward.  It flees from corruption, bad policies, conflict, 
                                                 
21 Patrice M. Franko, Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas: the Strategic Implications 
of the FTAA. (Washington D.C.: the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 11 
22 Larson, 21. Quoted from President Bush’s address in Monterrey, MX March 2002. 
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and unpredictability.”23 “All governments are responsible for creating their own 
economic policies and responding to their own economic challenges.  We will use our 
economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that 
generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth.”24The NSS states that a 
“long-term objective is a world in which all countries have investment-grade credit 
ratings.”25  
It has been established that generating a regional free trade agreement forces 
countries to not only internalize externalities, but agree to a measure of standard on 
transnational issues.  Besides the goal of FTAA by 2005 and the NSS proclaiming global 
economy as critical to national security, what other policies have parallel objectives of 
improving economic growth and security?  Are there any downsides to these ideals? 
 
 
D. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 
The National Security Strategy advocates pro-growth fiscal policies, lowering 
marginal tax rates, rule of law and intolerance of corruption, strong financial institutions, 
and sound fiscal policies, investments in health and education, and free trade. “Patient 
perseverance and respect for national sovereignty by the United States are the keys to 
promoting permanent and sustainable security architecture in the region.”26 The ironic 
side to “patient perseverance” is these expectations require countries throughout the 
region to do more with less.  It would take more government to address the problems of 
meeting the new coalition requirements as well as managing the economic gains.   
This chapter captures the perspective of the NSS take towards growth of 
developing countries; however, there are holes, or rather hypocritical goals, from the 
ambivalent super power. The NSS emphasizes the importance of strengthening the 
                                                 
23 Larson, 21. 
24 NSS, 17. 
25 NSS, 18. 
26 Franko, XVI 
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economies of our allies in Europe and Japan as well as preserving economic growth in 
the developing world. 
The comprehensive free trade strategy to protect American workers is perceived 
as contrary to extending economic growth to developing countries.  Protecting U.S. 
specific industries is vital to U.S. interests and national security, but expanding a global 
economy through free trade is part of the National Security Strategy.  This confusing 
arrangement can be summed up through an institutional analysis, examining why certain 
special interests have more power and influence on policy outcome.  This dilemma is 
relevant in relations with Brazil and other countries who look to the United States for fair 
and equal market opportunities, while at the same time being expected to make sacrifices. 
 
E. ANALYSIS 
There is a congressional requirement for a National Security Strategy to highlight 
and outline the physical strategic threats and/or objectives.  This chapter answered the 
question why expanding the global market is important to such strategy and national 
interests. When focusing on Latin America Patrice Franko says it best: “a wider array of 
strategic goals without a clear external orienting principle presents new opportunities and 
new challenges for U.S. relations with the hemisphere.”27  Amidst confusion, the 
National Security Strategy benefits from a “comprehensive strategy to promote free 
trade” toward Latin America. Regional coalitions that expand U.S. markets also build 
extensive security arrangements. 
“Today’s threats come less from massing armies than from small, 
shadowy bands of terrorists — less from strong states than from weak or 
failed states. And after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today 
America faces an existential threat to our security”28 
 
   This clearly expresses the legitimacy of trade agreements and economic growth 
and stability in Latin America as key to U.S. strategic concerns; however, the goal of 
FTAA by 2005 is not a means to an end.  The developing countries continue to embrace 
                                                 
27 Franko, 2 
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28 Condoleezza Rice, “The Balance of Power that Favors Freedom” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, an 
electronic journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol 7, Number 4, (2002), 5 
U.S.-led free trade agreements, whether bi-lateral, multi-lateral, or hemispheric 
coinciding with the National Security Strategy prescription.  There are costs associated 
with such agreements, but they do not outweigh the benefits gained from economic 
growth, multinational interdependence, and most importantly global security in this 
environment of terror and borderless criminals.   
The National Security Strategy is pillared by the importance of economic policies 
with regards to developing countries that are pragmatic, multilateral, and expand the 
global marketplace.  Left-wing presidents who campaign on social programs and fiscal 
policies counter to neoliberalism, are perceived as a threat to U.S. national interests.  This 
thesis is written to provide solace to Washington, that each situation must have its details 
fully investigated.  Institutions that exist and new ones created have more impact on the 
policies of a left-wing president recently elected.  The same notion is less valid in a 
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III. CHILEAN CASE STUDY 
Under what conditions do democratically elected left-wing parties successfully 
carry out free-market reforms?  This chapter will examine the institutions that permit or 
force democratically elected left-of-center executives to successfully carry out free-
market reforms.  Institutional considerations include international actors’ influence on 
domestic actors and their institutions that facilitate neoliberal economic reform, and how 
these elected heads of state implement free-market reforms, overcome obstacles created 
by domestic institutions, and the interact between the executive and legislative branches 
of government and political parties.  Institutional framework, actors and their preferences, 
and its interaction will first be generalized for an eventual study of Chile. 
Left-of-center parties are rhetorically against liberalizing markets, when in fact 
historical evidence proves otherwise in certain situations.  This chapter examines Chile 
under President Patricio Aylwin, 1989-1994, who a politically left-of-center leader who 
successfully implemented free-market reforms.  The case of Chile will support the 
hypothesis that left-of-center presidents can implement free-market reforms.29 The 
International Monetary Fund is sometimes viewed as the cause for economic reforms, but 
there is an avenue of reason where presidents will act on their own preferences, 
autonomous of international influence.30  Left-of-center presidents will act on their 
preferences either autonomously or compromise with actors whose preferences are 
similar, resulting in an aggregated coalition with which to interact in the boundaries of an 
institutional framework.   
Utilizing the political economy methodology, actors and their preferences 
encompass international actors, heads of state, sub-national actors, and organizations or 
institutions that possess a unified preference which may have influence upon other actors.  
The next step for this analysis is to identify how these actors group themselves through 
                                                 
29 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 138-140 emphasizes transitional costs. 
30 Barbara Geddes, “Building ‘State’ Autonomy in Brazil, 1930-1964,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, 
(January, 1990), 217. 
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cost-benefit compromises based on their preferences.31  This methodology is deductive in 
nature.  Policy outcomes are the end results whether you start with an examination of 
actors or institutional framework.   
Before delving into the case study, this chapter will identify some institutional 
nuances that, until now, were only briefly addressed.  Common understandings or 
institutional designs between democracies will be examined to provide influential 
frameworks for the outcome of policies.  
 
A. ACTORS AND THEIR PREFERENCES 
1. Heads of State 
Executive branches of government who have been elected by their people 
representing a political affiliation that is politically left-of-center theoretically could be 
moderate in their economic preferences merely to get elected, or are pragmatic in concern 
about economic policies and growth which results from policies represented by the 
“Washington Consensus.”  However, these pragmatic free-market reforms are in most 
cases difficult to swallow.  What causes a left-of-center president to abandon their 
political lines?  This question is first answered by two categories.  The first category 
contains reforms exercised by the president autonomously for the good of the country and 
the people.  This pragmatic approach originates from the president’s preference to seek 
neoliberal economic policies. Presidents could segregate themselves by retaining the 
label “left-wing” but contain instincts to implement neoliberal reforms, or have occurred 
because the state possessed enough autonomy to reform in tandem with or against the 
preferences of other actors.  A strong external influence could hold sway over a 
president’s preferences resulting from interpersonal relationships; like an older brother or 
the wiser “outside-looking-in” advisor role.  However the distinction is that economic 
liberalization is championed by the president. 
The second reason for a left-of-center president to support free-market reforms 
results from reaction to institutional factors.  A president would compromise economic 
                                                 
31 Jeffry Frieden, “The Method of Analysis: Modern Political Economy,” Modern Political Economy 
Theory and Latin America Policy, Edited by Jeffry Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr., Michael Tomz. Westview 
Press: Boulder, Colorado. 2000. 37-43 
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policies for other agenda items, or be a victim of a more powerful actor’s preferences. 
This category emphasizes power as a possession in existing institutions.  Power within 
institutions could be focused on actors or a group of actors who aggregated their 
influence to achieve a mutual objective.  Second category reforms are due directly to the 
lack of presidential power or influence on economic policies, or result from low 
presidential priority.  This dilemma is the key to the socio-economic explanation of 
economic policies contradicting preferences.  The work is in digging for the details. 
 
2. International Actors 
International actors’ preferences differ as much as their identities do.  
International actors encompass multinational corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and heads of states with their diplomats.  The preferences of multinational 
corporations are predominantly financial; furthermore, along that line of preferences in 
regards to economic reforms, MNC’s would choose either for or against based on three 
criteria: 1) Will reform bring profits?  2) Will the benefits of this reform outweigh the 
costs?  3) Do these reforms pay back the lent money with interest, or at least continue 
providing a return or investment?  The latter of the three preferences is arguably the most 
important to the corporations featured in this paper because economic reforms are not 
varied.  Holding the dependent variable constant, neoliberal economic reforms create a 
preference bias derived from the corporations, so much that these reforms concentrate on 
fiscal discipline as well as freeing markets and resources to the corporations’ advantage. 
International governmental organizations’ (IGOs) interests in economic reforms 
are focused on social implications such as economic growth, worker’s rights, poverty 
reduction, income equality, infrastructure development, institutional development, or 
fiscal discipline, to name a few.  IGOs with the greatest impact on economic reforms in 
Latin America include such institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Catholic Church.  The international 
social NGOs like the Church and AFL-CIO have preferences toward economic reforms 
partial to a specific social agenda, human rights, equality, worker’s rights, and party 
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organization, which are fundamentally distinguishable on the domestic or state level of 
analysis by more financially motivated NGOs. 
IGOs like the World Bank and other development banks have a vested interest in 
economic reforms beyond social applications.  Development banks are organized to lend 
money to countries for infrastructure projects like roads, dams, or bridges.  However, 
these banks must be reimbursed the money lent, including interest, in order to continue 
this service to other nations.  Neoliberal economic reforms are favored by development 
banks because they highlight reducing and increasing revenue in order to pay the bills.  
The banknotes are a priority expense, thus aligning their preferences toward reforms of 
this nature; to get back to the point, what is their role in influencing countries and their 
presidents to institute neoliberal reforms. 
The IGO who has the most influence on Latin American economic policies is the 
IMF.  The IMF provides short-term funds to countries struggling through an economic 
downturn or suffering the woes of economic reforms.  However, there are two powerful 
consequences that come with seeking the IMF for assistance.  First and foremost is the 
conditionality of loans.  The IMF will not loan funds unless free-market reforms are 
instituted, in fact the loans are phased in as a country meets predetermined criteria of 
reforms.  In essence the IMF preferences will almost always be toward neoliberal 
reforms, because the availability of IMF funds is conditioned around such reforms.  The 
second consequence is that before any development bank will invest in a country, an up-
check from the IMF must first be obtained.  This adds to IMF’s legitimacy and the power 
it wields over developing countries. 
The IMF wields power over developing countries with its approval certification 
for development banks and its access to funds designed to shore up democratic 
governments’ economies to prevent collapse or bankruptcy.  The conditions required by 
the IMF are in the interests of the fund itself and for investors from other NGOs or 
MNC’s because of the fundamental reform required for these countries to have greater 
revenue expenses: maintaining the repayment of loans and investments and their interest 
as a mandatory expense.  This tends to rally international actors behind the IMF and their 
preferences; on the other hand this does not usurp the autonomy of the president, but 
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leads us to further our investigation into how these actors group and then come to an 
agreement based on the institutional frameworks to navigate.  
  
B. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Institutional framework is arranged by tangible and intangible institutions.  
Tangible institutions include buildings, organizations, constitutions, laws, and 
administrative rules.  Intangible institutions focus on the interpersonal networks, the 
charisma of a leader, or loopholes in a tangible institution.  Intangibles can be culturally 
derived from customs and ceremonies.  The web of actors interacting through these 
institutions constitutes the framework.  As a reminder, “institutions are the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy.”32   
Jeffrey Frieden best explains the importance of institutional framework in trying 
to explain reforms: “to explain how the constraints set by existing institutions affect the 
political activities  of socioeconomic interests…illuminating the process by which social 
actors work through markets, parties, bureaucracies, and political systems to obtain their 
goals.”33 
 
C. POLICY OUTCOMES 
Preferences toward free-market reforms held by a president are greatly dependent 
upon the individual, which vary between hard line supports to hard line opposition.  Once 
again, due to the scope of the case study selection holding the dependent variable 
constant, the preferences of left-of-center presidents chosen will vary but generally fall in 
the middle of opposition hard liners.  The occurrence of free-market reforms can not spell 
out the preferences of the presidents; altogether the left-of-center presidents would prefer 
national control of markets, resources, and policies.   
                                                 
32 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Talyor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 
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33 Frieden, 42. 
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As mentioned earlier, international actors influence left-of-center presidents, 
especially in the developing countries of Latin America.  The presidents pursue their 
interests for state economy while confronting intervention by institutional designs for 
insulation or actors’ persuasion.  The policy outcome (free-market reform) will not 
resemble the initially desired end state unless the state can afford the autonomy.  
Therefore, the policy outcomes are a result of established institutions and new institutions 
created by actors with the most power and influences.  The preferences of individual 
presidents will be more closely defined within individual case studies, but the bottom line 
is that the answers are in the details.  Black box theories cannot explain the policy 
outcomes of domestic polity.   The actor preferences, their influence, their grouping of 
interest, and the institutions they establish or conduct their efforts through determine 
policy outcome. 
 
D. CHILEAN ACTORS, THEIR PREFERENCES, AND HOW THEY GROUP 
President Patricio Aylwin was the first elected president in Chile after the military 
dictatorship under General Pinochet.  President Aylwin was nominated on the 
Concertacion ticket, formed from the unification of the Socialist and Christian Democrat 
Party in opposition to the right-wing conservatives and military regime.  Aylwin interests 
were closely aligned with the Christian Democrats’ left-of-center preferences, including 
government intervention to ease social inequality, nationalization of industries, and state 
management of monetary policy.  Remnants of Pinochet’s economic programs were 
unregulated big business.  Pinochet is credited for precedent-setting economic 
liberalization.  While his administration may have started the momentum, it was the 
Aylwin administration’s egalitarian perspective that consolidated and furthered reform. 
However, President Aylwin did not possess complete control over the state’s 
policy.  The executive branch’s preferences were split in two.  On one side, there were 
goals to increase taxes for social programs, while the other contended on continuing 
liberalization.34  Aylwin’s preferences leaned toward social programs which ran counter 
to the preferences of Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley who had a decisive role in public 
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policy developemnt35  The finance ministry in the beginning was a unified, cohesive, and 
integrated institution, virtually autonomous from political oversight.36  Foxley closely 
collaborated with Carlos Ominami, minister of the economy, further strengthening his 
role in determining policy.37 
To summarize Chile’s governmental preferences, Aylwin interests were social 
programs, but his minister of finance wanted to further free-market reforms.  These 
competing agendas were individually thought to be in the best interest of Chile.  The 
perfect example was the dilemma between government, private business, and labor left 
by Pinochet.  Under Pinochet, taxes on business profits were lower than the regional 
average, and employers had gained almost complete control over workplaces.38  In the 
midst of this issue, Patricio Aylwin’s priority was to find a compromise that would 
strengthen Chilean democracy. The business-labor-tax issue demonstrates the importance 
of institutions in making policy.  Taxes on profits were raised from 10 to 15 percent to 
fund social programs, but remained well below the majority of Latin American countries; 
while labor conditions minimally improved with a slightly higher minimum wage and 
some restraint on a firm’s right to fire.39  
The multiple political parties from the democracy prior to Pinochet retained their 
identities, but aggregated their policy positions and power into two dominant political 
coalitions.  The Concertacion is made up of the Socialist Party of Chile, Christian 
Democratic Party, and Party for Democracy, Social Democratic Radical Party, Social 
Democratic Party, and Center Alliance Party.  The conservative party is known as the 
Alliance for Chile and is composed of the conservative right wing, including National 
Renovation, Independent Democratic Union, and Progressive Center-Center Union. 
Some scholars believe unifying into two coalitions as superficial, a result of 
elaborate political pacts; “pacts that intensify inter-party conflicts rather that promote 
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party unity.”40 The effects of two political coalitions competing for majority in the 
parliament will aggregate, organize, and gravitate ideals toward the moderate middle to 
accommodate party members.  Given this bi-polar political environment, preferences can 
be clearly assigned to either left- or right-of-center along the political spectrum.  Right-
wing conservative preferences distinguish the importance of decentralizing state 
influence in the economy from policy making to industrial management.  Chilean right-
wing ideals economic ideology aligned closely with the “Washington Consensus”. 
During this time of democratization, the military aligned themselves squarely behind the 
Alliance party and continued loyal support of General Pinochet, Commander of the 
Army, who had not completely distanced himself form politics. On the opposite end of 
the political spectrum, left-wing preferences rely on the civil and fair hand of the state to 
manage, govern, and implement economic strategies to promote justice and equality.  
Left-of-center interests argue against neoliberal reforms; supporting price controls and 
market insulation for the purpose of affordable products grown and manufactured by and 
for Chileans.  
 






Figure 1.   Economic Policy Continuum 
 
E. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND PREFERENCES 
“Foreign actors may affect the development of internal political and economic 
conditions either by specific actions or by omission.”41 International actors’ preferences 
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in Chile focused on social support and recovery from the transgressions recently 
experienced under Pinochet.  The majority of external actors’ input in Chile during 
Aylwin’s administration focused on human rights violations; funding for local NGOs, 
social movements, and political parties.42 The IMF and World Bank were in favor of 
free-market policies, which the United States supported to the extent of seeking a U.S. 
bilateral trade agreement.  However, there existed under Aylwin’s presidency resistance 
to Pinochet’s “Chicago Team,” which was not without international influence.  “The 
World Bank’s close working relationship with the military regime was deeply resented by 
the Concertacion officials, and officials of the bank reluctantly came to accept that this 
situation constrained their influence.”43 
The Chileans were relatively successful at implementing neoliberal economic 
reforms under the Pinochet administration, which constrained the following Contertacion 
government.  This success has led many developing nations to conclude that autonomous 
leaders are required to institute reform, to be more successful after a crisis.  Jose Pinera 
was Minister of Labor and Social Security under Pinochet, and he attributes their success 
to four points: a unified coalition, the element of surprise, the media or will of the people, 
and a leader.44  These four points are not given equal weight; in fact, the most influential 
dynamic of their success was the coalition of economists.  Pinera interviewed one of the 
generals under Pinochet as to why, of all the policy advice available to the generals from 
businessmen, industry leaders, and lawyers, they chose to listen to them.  The General 
answered, ‘Because you agreed with each other and gave us simple answers to our 
questions.”45 The fact is the Chilean team of economists were similarly trained and 
educated by western, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economics at the University of Chicago.46  The 
University of Chicago’s influence on economic policy became so interwoven in the 
Chilean economic fabric that, “by the mid-1970’s a core group of some 50-100 of Chile’s 
best economists were thoroughly conversant with and convinced of the need to adopt a 
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free-market approach to economic policy.”47In an effort not to belabor this digression, 
the economic success of Pinochet was due to a coalition of like-minded economists, 
central to the theme of this thesis that institutions are significant in successful reforms.   
External actors during the Aylwin administration concentrated their attention on 
sustaining the transition to democracy and maintaining neoliberal reforms.  The first task 
was to supervise, facilitate, monitor, and motivate the transition to be bloodless and 
establish a sound foundation for consolidation. On the other hand, the previous success of 
the military regime in instituting free-market reforms meant that the influence of IGOs in 
economic policy was less critical once it became clear that President Aylwin inauguration 
and his ministers continued neoliberal policies. 
 
F. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Chile’s transition to democracy from authoritarian rule was controlled, methodical 
and bloodless, which facilitated leaders in opposition to the military and conservatives to 
organize and consolidate their political agenda.  Institutional frameworks played a very 
significant role in the transition of Chilean democracy, providing a window of 
opportunity for the Aylwin administration to build a consensus around economic 
policy.48  Lingering institutions after Pinochet stepped down were both good and bad.  
Remnants left behind included decentralized state control, liberalized economy, and a 
lingering electoral system designed to encourage gridlock in the congress by empowering 
the minority with a disproportionate occupation of seats.49  
 
1. Executive Branch 
In the beginning of Aylwin’s administration there was great cohesion between the 
President, the Chilean elites, and the finance minister in setting public policy.50  The 
Interministerial Committee on the Economy included the President, the Secretary of the 
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Presidency, the Minister of Finance, the head of the Central Bank, the Minister of the 
Economy, the Minister of Public Works, and the Minister of Labor.  This committee was 
lead by Minister of Finance Foxely, who collaborated closely with the Minister of the 
Economy to develop macroeconomic policy for the administration.51 The successful 
insulation of the committee, combined with the pragmatic nature of Aylwin, 
compromised the president’s preferences; appearing economically liberal contrary to his 
political alignment. 
 
2. Legislative Branch 
A legacy of the constitution enacted during the Pinochet regime, Chile’s 
binominal-majoritarian electoral system requires two seats representing each and every 
district in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies with an additional nine seats in the 
Senate permanently occupied (until 1997) by Pinochet appointees.  In both houses the 
first seat of a district is won by the candidate with the majority vote.  The second seat is 
filled by the party with the next highest proportion of the vote, unless the proportion of 
the votes for the party are twice that of as any other runner-up party, thereby granting the 
party both seats in the district.  General Pinochet abided by the constitution, and within 
the constitution left rigid remnants of disproportionate right-wing power in the 
legislature. “The peculiar binominal electoral system was aimed at securing 
congressional representation of the right—a numerical minority—well beyond its share 
of the ballot.”52  The Concertacion had consistently gained the majority victories in every 
district for seats in both the house and Senate, but to no avail.  The disproportionate seats 
held by the Alliance Party and the rigid constitution hindered any attempts at 
constitutional or legislative amendments, which a require two-thirds majority vote and in 
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3. Military 
Aylwin’s patient construction of institutions through the transition was discussed 
earlier as a key to the democratic success of Chile; however Commander of the Army 
General Pinochet’s decision to abide by the constitution he had enacted also facilitated a 
successful transition to democracy.  Pinochet was asked to resign as commander by 
president-elect Aylwin, yet he was said to have quoted his constitutional right to remain 
in command.53 The military remained autonomous and insulated from the government, 
including civilian prosecution.  Aylwin, known for his pragmatism, also respected the 
constitution and paid a great deal of attention in trying to amend it working through the 
available legal mechanisms.  
Dealing The military during the Aylwin administration, still under the supervision 
of Pinochet, served as a distraction that diverted national attention toward legislative and 
constitutional reforms, thus leaving free-market reforms a tertiary concern.  Much 
political attention was given to bringing justice to the human rights violations under the 
military regime.  President Aylwin and the new democracy were concerned by the 
possibility of another military overthrow, since the military was virtually immune to 
civilian authority.  Their funding came from the copper mines, their leadership came 
from Pinochet, and the disproportionate conservative wing in the legislature stood as firm 
opposition in any change in this arrangement.  Historically, Latin American armies have 
acted autonomously within the state, and the Chilean democracy did not initially appear 
to be any different.54  
 
G. CHILEAN POLICY OUTCOMES 
The Aylwin administration instituted a number of economic reforms that seem to 
run contrary to the political preferences of the president.  Judith Teichman provides a list 
of successful free-market reform which Table 1 uses but also includes Carol Graham’s 
research on the social programs that support and stabilize first generation market reforms. 
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To enumerate these free-market policies, Table 1 includes a numerical guide to economic 
reform delineated by John Williamson, in his article on the “Washington Consensus”. 
Williamson’s ten areas of policy reform as the criteria of successful market-oriented 
reforms: (1) fiscal discipline, (2) public expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) 
financial liberalization, (5) exchange rates, (6) trade liberalization, (7) foreign direct 
investment, (8) privatization, (9) deregulation, (10) property rights.55   
 
 
Neoliberal Reform Effects “Washington 
Consensus” 
1990: tax reform to raise revenue Revenue raised for social 
programs to further stabilize 
the Chilean economy. 
2, 3, 9 
1990: Established Fund for Solidarity and Social 
Investment 
Local control of operations 
and funding 
1,2,9 
1991: tariff reduction from 15 to 11 percent Moderate reduction limits 
social impact 
3,5,6,9 
1991: completed privatization of Chilean airline Increased efficiency in the 
industry, better prices for 
consumers 
8 
1992: foreign investment restrictions loosened Allowed private capital 
access to industry, including 
CODELCO 
7 
1993: announcement of remaining state owned 
companies to be privatized: except CODELCO 
(Chilean Copper Mines) 
May not have been an 
implemented policy, but 
reflected neoliberal reform 
momentum. 
8 
1994: bill to break up CODELCO in division; 
non-mining division to be privatized 
CODELCO remains as a 
source of income to the 
military 
7, 8 
1990-1994: bilateral trade agreements with 
United States and Mexico 
President George Bush was 
able to visit President 
Aylwin in Chile developing a 
relationship between the 
nations to a potential 




Reforms were delineated from Judith Teichman and Carol Graham.  Authors interpretation 
Table 1. Reforms Under Patricio Aylwin 
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The list provided by Teichman left out social programs, high on President 
Aylwin’s policy agenda, which were successfully implemented.  The additional revenue 
from tax reforms were used to fund social programs that provided primary school 
education to the most disadvantaged areas in the country as well as funded the Fund for 
Solidarity and Social Investment (FOSIS).56  FOSIS can be counted among the neoliberal 
successes because it both “built local participation into its operations and limit(ed) the 
potential for centralized political control.”57  The successful implementation of these 
social programs came from the willing compromise between government and private 
enterprise on profit tax. 
 
H. ANALYSIS 
Under what conditions do democratically elected left-wing parties successfully 
carry out free-market reforms?  Free-market reforms are synonymous with neoliberal 
reforms or those considered part of the “Washington Consensus,” which, according to 
Robert Looney, is founded on three core concepts: imperfect information, individual 
freedoms, and the primacy of markets.58  Looney argues that neoliberalism is founded on 
the freedom of individuals to seek their interests in a “societal institution” liberated of 
restrictions to provide the individual with price signals to adjust their preferences.  This 
definition reinforces the assumption highlighting the importance of freedom and rational 
choice; subsequently liberating economic polices is dependent on institutions and the 
actors who have influence.   
This chapter argues that international actors lacked significant influence in Chile’s 
economic reforms under President Aylwin, a unique scenario in Latin America 
considering examples of IMF-generated reforms in Brazil and Argentina.  Most literature 
published on Chile’s economic success ignores President Aylwin’s free-market reforms 
in favor of the successful reforms of General Pinochet’s authoritarian rule and his team of 
economists, the “Chicago Boys.”  However, Aylwin’s administration promulgated free-
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market reforms in an environment of distraction, democratic barriers, and transitional 
baggage.  In fact, the successful reforms become more impressive in view of a culturally 
strong autonomous state, because the policy outcome reflected a compromise of the 
president’s preferences. 
President Aylwin successfully implemented free-market reforms whether or not 
they mirrored his preferences.  His preferences were fixing the social issues of inequality, 
poverty, justice for human rights violations, and economic stability.  However, these 
social programs and interests encountered immense institutional barriers, and resulted in 
degraded power and influence on policy outcomes.  His loss of autonomy began with the 
insulation of his Interministrial Committee on the Economy, led by Foxely, which 
administered the executive branch of the government public policy.  It was only through 
compromise and cooperation that committee was effective. The remnants of Pinochet’s 
authoritarian regime created barriers to Aylwin’s social programs.  Institutional barriers 
included the political strength of right-wing congressmen in pacifying any success in 
constitutional or legislative reforms resulting from the disproportionate binominal-
majoritarian electoral system for legislative seats.  Military autonomy over funding 
robbed the state of copper revenue, and the international actors showed minimal concerns 
with the direction of the Chilean markets. Aside from informal institutions, Aylwin’s 
economic preferences were also inhibited by the dynamics of the transition back to 
democracy, the continuing role of General Pinochet as Commander of the Army, and the 
international spotlight of justice for human rights violators. 
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Brazil has the seventh largest economy in the world and is an important trading 
partner of the United States.  In recent years trade relations have been little more than 
cordial, even though both countries are in favor of free-trade markets.  Critical domestic 
markets within both countries have been protected and used against one another as 
leverage in trade talks.  The United States protects its steel industry and orange juice 
producers by restricting Brazilian imports, and Brazil has slowed progress towards a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas.  New concerns have arisen among U.S. policy makers with 
the inauguration of President Luiz Ignácio (Lula) da Silva, leader of the Brazilian 
Workers Party, who has been severely critical of U.S. foreign policy and economic 
strategies in the region.  This criticism was clearly a part of his electoral campaign, but 
there were sincere concerns among U.S. policy makers that these critiques would 
translate into concrete policies once President da Silva took power. 
Disregarding the rhetoric of campaign propaganda, U.S. concerns with Brazil 
stem from the possible policy shifts under Lula that may hurt its economy and the entire 
region.  Investors tend to view criticism of U.S. economic policies as a leading indicator 
of a shift away from market reforms.  This chapter argue that regardless of the political 
preference of the president, free-market or neoliberal economic reforms will still be the 
result of the contemporary Brazilian political process.  This chapter will analyze Brazil’s 
economic policies under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a successful left-of-
center politician.  His economic policies would prove him to be a pragmatic executive.  
The successful economic reforms initiated and instituted by Cardoso did not occur in a 
political vacuum.  This chapter will demonstrate the impact that Brazilian state 
institutions had on these reforms.   
This chapter will show how President Cardoso created institutions to successfully 
implement neoliberal reforms, yet did not have autonomous power to complete every step 
in the process.  President Cardoso came to power with politically left ideals but turned 
around to commit Brazil to open markets.  Cardoso’s pragmatic policy agenda was met 
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with opposition toward the end of his rule, which forced compromise and cooperation on 
issues of “first generation” reforms.59    
Brazil was in a very unique situation when it elected Cardoso since it had a 
history of two failed heterodox economic policies since the return to democracy in 1985, 
and it was only beginning to see the fruits of the reforms that Cardoso himself had 
implemented as Finance Minister.60  “Populism and economic nationalism were the very 
cornerstones of the system, which saw a continual, albeit uneven, distribution of 
entitlements and favors by the state.”61  The Jose Sarney administration (1985-1989) 
instituted a heterodox economic program that called for a wage, price, and exchange rate 
freeze; as well as a new currency to avoid deflation from the existing high interest rate.62  
This Cruzado Plan, named after the new currency, was a failure after one year of limited 
success until hyperinflation shredded the currency.  Riordan Roett, a political scientist 
from Johns Hopkins University, called the Cruzado Plan “an act of Hobbesian 
desperation given the fragmented nature of Brazilian federalism, weak political parties, 
and a high level of rent-seeking at all levels of government.”63  The second failure of 
economic policy came under the President Fernando Collor de Mello who introduced 
another heterodox reform program resulting, as witnessed before, into hyperinflation and 
economic collapse. 64  Only after the impeachment of President Collor de Mello did 
Brazil take the first steps towards neoliberal reforms.  
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Under Cardoso, Brazil successfully instituted neoliberal reform policies that at 
first glance seemed to run contrary Cardoso’s academic socialist background.  What 
motivated Cardoso to support orthodox economic programs given his historical alignment 
with the political left?  How could these policies be so successful given the weakness of 
political structures in Brazil’s new democracy?  Was the United States as concerned with 
Cardoso’s election as they are with Lula’s presidency?   





Figure 2.   Economic Policy Continuum 
 
 
A.  ACTORS AND PREFERENCES 
This section will examine three areas, starting with the focal point of the chapter, 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.  The detailed account of Cardoso as an individual 
and eventual executive will be followed by an examination domestic actors, who either 
cooperated with the economic reforms for their own benefit, or were an obstacle to 
reform.  Finally, international actors will be examined for their impact on Brazil’s 
neoliberal policy outcomes. 
1.  Head of State  
Fernando Henrique Cardoso was a president who won an enormous amount of 
support from his economic agendas, as evidenced in his election to two terms as 
president, the second term only as a result of a constitutional amendment allowing it.  
Despite his remarkably pragmatic term in office, Cardoso began his academic career as a 
politically leftist scholar, Cardoso did not publicly associate himself with the communist 
party, but early in his career he wrote for the journal Fundamentos, which was widely 
known as a communist periodical.65  In an interview by Ted Goertzel, a Communist Party 
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member and friend of Cardoso says, “Fellow traveler is a good term to describe Fernando 
Henrique’s relationship to the party, although ‘in an intellectual sense.’”66  Goertzel 
uncovers an article review written by Cardoso for the Fundamentos, in April 1952 which 
encapsulates this chapter’s point of portraying Cardoso as having a solid socialist 
background. “Cardoso writes, ‘capital is formed by the exploitation of the labor force of 
the majority of the population for the benefit of the few and at the cost of general 
impoverishment.”67  Cardoso felt that capitalism was the formal suppression of people by 
the wealthy few businessmen and is not in the interests of the people to inspire their 
support.  Cardoso would also assist in assembling a group of renowned Brazilian scholars 
to critically study and discuss interpretations of Karl Marx works.  Even his doctoral 
dissertation took a Marxist perspective on the role of capitalism and slavery in Brazil.68 
The 1964 coup d’etat spotlighted the political divisions at universities all over Brazil, 
where conservatives seized the opportunity to repress communist and socialist parties or 
forums.  Cardoso took this opportunity to continue his work abroad.  While in exile, 
Fernando Henrique co-authored his most famous work with Enzo Faletto, Dependency 
and Development in Latin America, a seminal work in the field of dependency theory.69 
After returning from exile Fernando Cardoso spent the 1970s continuing to write about 
dependency theory, studying and writing about urban problems, and exploring the 
alignment of political forces in Brazil.70   
Cardoso was elected senator of the Sao Paulo district, and represented many 
special interests that were in favor of protectionism.  This alignment to state-centric 
polices place him the opposite side of the prominent Senator Roberto Campos—a free-
market, neoliberal advocate—who prescribed policies of privatization, fiscal stability, 
and decentralization that Cardoso later also advocated.71  Cardoso would later become 
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the finance minister under President Franco, and would assemble a team predominately 
comprised of U.S.-trained economists and former civil servants responsible for authoring 
the Cruzado Plan in 1986. This team would develop an economic agenda to cut 
government spending by $6 billion, tighten tax collection, and resolve financial 
relationships between the federal government and deeply indebted state governments.72  
The Real Plan also pegged the new currency to the dollar to stabilize hyperinflation.  The 
success of the Real Plan catapulted him into the presidency, where he continued a 
neoliberal policy agenda. 
President Cardoso took office ten years after the fall of the military regime, 
coming to the conclusion that Brazil had a choice between two strategies for 
development.  The first was ‘populist developmentalism’ that mobilizes the population in 
support of state-centric ‘redistributionist policies.’73  The alternative was “associated 
developmentalism, which works with multinational corporations and agencies.”74 
Goertzel writes that Cardoso felt the left needed to understand they had lost the political 
debate over development strategy, while the military in power uses the first strategy, but 
needed to focus its energy on democratization.75   
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration, which included the finance minister 
Pedro Milan, developed a privatization and trade liberalization program of “six far-
reaching amendments” to the 1988 constitution.  “The changes included provisions to 
allow foreign-owned companies to invest in mineral and oil extraction, to offer national 
treatment to foreign firms, to allow both Brazilian and foreign firms to provide telephone 
and data transmission services, to allow foreign companies to compete in coastal 
shipping, and to allow domestic and foreign entities to distribute natural gas to 
households and industries.”76   
Unlike other left-of-center presidents in Latin America, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso was the protagonist of neoliberal reforms.  Instead of being forced to adopt 
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neoliberal reforms by other domestic or international actors operating within the 
institutional arrangements inherited from the previous military dictatorship, Cardoso 
became a pragmatic president whose personal preferences became secondary to effective 
economic policies.  Cardoso honestly believed and advocated that neoliberal reforms, as 
represented in the ‘Washington Consensus,’ would benefit the Brazilian people. 
 
2. Domestic Actors 
Before and after Cardoso’s inauguration, Brazil’s domestic politics was governed 
by minority coalitions.  Weak and fragmented political parties created an environment of 
fragile governing conditions.  Domestic elites were either protected or benefited from 
inflationary conditions, and formed small but powerful coalitions opposed to policies of 
neoliberal reforms.77   
In the beginning of Cardoso’s presidency the administration possessed a strong 
and legitimate political coalition, which resulted from the success of the Real Plan and 
overwhelming election victory. 
a.  Legislature 
The preferences of the legislature cannot be pinned down to a specific 
agenda.  Congress is as politically diverse as the country. Another reason an agenda 
cannot be clearly identified is due to the fragmented political party system.  A clear 
majority is only achieved through minority coalition building, which invariably leads to 
sacrifices of preferences through compromise.  The legislature’s preferences are most 
effective and influential when used to destroy policy initiatives vice supporting them.  
Giving disproportionate power to narrow social interest groups influences policy, but 
more importantly weighing in or policy reform.78 
 
 
                                                 
77 Philippe Faucher, “Restoring Governance: Has Bazil Got It Right (At Last)?, Markets and 
Democracy in Latin America: Conflict or Convergence?, ed. Philip Oxhorn and Pamela K. Starr, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 105. 
78 Peter R. Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and macroeconomic Stability: Implications for 
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil,” Markets and Democracy in Latin America: Conflict or Convergence? 
Ed., Philip Oxhorn and Pamela K. Starr, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999), 134 
42 
b.  Political Parties 
Brazilian political parties have a historical foundation of being easily 
manipulated by a strong state or politically strong elites.  Weak party institutions and its 
lack of accountability allow politicians to abuse the party’s individual political careers.79 
Philippe Faucher perfectly captures the difficulty with identifying a unifying common 
preference.  
At the political level, failure resulted from a weakly institutionalized party 
system and the absence of an aggregative agenda, which exacerbated the 
fragmentation of interest representation in Congress and thereby limited 
the government’s ability to build stable majority coalitions.80 
Political parties in Brazil have an identity crisis.  The dilemma is the 
struggle between who defines the party; the politician or the party. The party is identified 
by the candidate running for election, because the party does not finance them and have 
little impact in the nominating process. Power the party may possess originates from 
politician’s autonomy and not an institutional norm or constitution.  The Worker’s Party 
(PT) — the statist left wing popular party—has been the only ideologically consistent 
major party and is the only party that demonstrates “party-line voting.”81 
c.  Labor Unions 
Labor unions were one of the most protected institutions during the 
economic crisis years.  Labor unions by design are the aggregated preferences and 
interests of its members, and in particular the unions represented the growing middle 
class.  The heterodox policies protected the workers through its price and wage freezes, 
clearly defining their preferences.  An example of union’s preferences: after the Cruzado 
Plan of 1986, “thousands of volunteers rampaged though the streets to check prices,” 
because once the program began it was in the interest of the middle class to ensure public 
compliance and was not impacted by distributional costs.82  Once the plan failed to 
stabilize inflation and prices were revalued the government was paralyzed and failed to 
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implement necessary fiscal reform.  The middle class in labor unions were better off than 
the poor who were dramatically affected by inflation and the wage freezes that 
guaranteed class wages expanding the distributional gap. 
3.  International Actors 
International actors like the IMF have held that neoliberal economic policies are 
the keys to a growing economy, but more importantly view adherence to these policies as 
a way to reassure lenders and investors they will get their money back.83 Brazil has 
always been attractive as a market for international investors, which has led to a level of 
tolerance toward its policy setbacks and incoherence.84  For example, in 2001 the IMF 
offered an additional loan, $30 billion total with $6 billion given in 2002 and the rest 
given after the election in 2003; in an effort to guarantee the new administration 
adherence to the provisions and fiscal targets.85 Leniency is not often given to other Latin 
American countries required to insulate central banks or use create currency boards, but 
the fear of a Brazilian default is also incentive to be tolerant.  
 
B.  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Political framework in Brazil was less than conducive to implementing neoliberal 
reforms, yet the need for economic success was greater than in Chile. 
 
1.  Constitutional framework 
Brazil is a presidential democracy where the executive is selected by majority 
vote while the congress is selected by proportional representation.  This institutional 
arrangement and historical voting attitudes have led to a weak political party system.86 
Proportional elections facilitate and cater to special interests.  If one party is not 
completely aligned with a candidate or voter, that individual can leave or create a new 
                                                 
83 Roett, “Brazil’s Protracted Transition,” 211 
84 Kingstone, “Implications for Democratic Consolidation in Brazil,”136 
85 Roett, “Brazil’s Protracted Transition,” 211 
86 Scott Mainwaring, “Introduction,” Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin 
America, ed., Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1995), 12 
44 
party.  The advantage of a proportional system is every minority has a voice in the 
democracy, but there is limited benefit to being loyal to a party.  
a.  Executive Branch 
Cardoso had a very difficult task in trying to aggregate support for his 
economic agenda.  As Philippe Faucher points out, widespread partrimonialism and 
clientelism, inadequate resources, and an erosion of professional staffs weakened the 
state.87  The process of implementing reform to improve this bleak scenario was more of 
a balancing when trying to collect a majority of support from special interest groups, 
legislators, and state’s governors in order to implement policy.  In the beginning of 
Cardoso’s presidency the momentum of the Real Plan pacifying inflation collected 
support from the population and those politicians popularly supported, but political elites 
who were protected or benefited from an inflationary environment remained in 
opposition.   
The selection of key economic leaders was a way for President Cardoso to 
signal his commitment to economic reform. As Roett argues, “The appointment of 
Arminio Fraga, a Princeton-trained economist, as the new central bank president quickly 
restored international investor confidence and domestic support for continued reform.”88  
Fraga had worked closely with financier George Soros, and was known by Wall Street’s 
investors, traders, and analysts; any policies he’d introduce would be viewed as reliably 
market-friendly.”89  Cardoso had used his executive appointments to solidify legislative 
alliance, which grew to a fairly consistent 60 percent support from congress.90 
b.  Legislative Branch 
The Brazilian congress had ten political parties represented during the 
1988 constitutional reform.91  Such a varied representation requires coalitional behavior 
for legislation to be passed, which waters down effective policies satiating individual 
congressmen‘s preferences.  As well, without a clearly defined majority, opposition tends 
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to have a paralyzing effect on policies.  The military regime’s impact on the legislature 
left a legacy of “widespread corruption, institutionalized violence, and an under-funded 
and ineffective judicial system…”  The legacy of clientelism among the political elites 
was directly opposed to any stabilization programs, especially if it impacted the balance 
of power.  There was limited room for compromise away from institutionalized 
protection granted by the state from the military regime through the transitional 
government’s heterodox economic policies. Because of fragmented political 
representation and the absence of a clear, stable, and coherent majority in congress until 
1994, the Brazilian presidents were never in a position to obtain the clear vote of support 
necessary to implement the “transitional costs of stabilization on a skeptical 
population.”92 
2.  Informal institutions 
Cardoso’s program suffered some early defeats but also demonstrated a number 
of successes, thanks to a clever combination of the use of democratic tools of negotiation 
and “traditional” political practice based on the selective allocation of funds and state 
patronage.93 
a.  Social Inequalities 
Privatization and trade liberalization proved to have a negative impact on 
the economy and markets in general until the reforms stabilized.94  Unfortunately it was 
the poor, unemployed, and lower classes of society who suffered most by these reforms.  
In a political environment as populist as Brazil, the poor and downtrodden become a 
political force.  But there is another dimension to Brazilian social poverty, and that is the 
enormity of the situation that attracts international attention as well as domestic.  Of the 
many social inequalities, education and the distribution gap had arisen as the dominant 
obstacles to neoliberal reforms. 
As of 1997 only 37 percent of Brazilians between the ages of sixteen and 
eighteen were enrolled in secondary schools and approximately half of the labor force 
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had minimal to zero formal schooling.95 Rigid labor institutions were formed early in 
Brazil’s history in an effort to protect workers from economic hardships during the state-
directed industrialization.  The impact of economic reforms on labor institutions will lead 
only a few, the one with educations, to take advantage of the new opportunities, thereby 
increasing the inequalities of employment and income.96  It is from these social 
inequalities, rigid institutions, and state-centric social policies of protection that led to the 
1988 constitution stipulating the transfer of federal tax revenues to the “states and 
municipalities without a concomitant transfer of responsibility for the implementation of 
social policy.”97 
President Cardoso had built a solid foundation of support from the 
population with his Real Plan, which helped stave off increased poverty and inequality by 
dousing hyperinflation.  But his quest for social equality did not end there.  A true 
socialist, his social agenda was bent on reforming education, employment, health care, 
agriculture, sanitation, housing, and social security.  However, the twist to Cardoso’s 
social agenda was his administration’s intent for all reforms to be innovative, 
decentralized, and cost-efficient.  John Williamson’s “Washington Consensus” embraces 
Cardoso’s social agenda with the public expenditure and property rights sections of 
reforms. 
 
C.  POLICY OUTCOMES 
When Cardoso took office there were eighteen political parties represented in 
congress, each “valuing patronage over any ideological position.”98 The institutional 
framework of weak politician accountability to their respective political party, 
proportional electorate, and patronage and clientelism destroyed the legislature’s 
effectiveness and proved to be too big of a barrier for Cardoso to overcome,  especially 
after his initial appointment’s guaranteed loyalty expired and economic crisis ensued in 
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Asia and later in Latin America.  Cardoso experienced early defeats by the congress on 
social security reforms, a much needed reform for fiscal health.  With the lessons of 
unsuccessful heterodox policies, the legislature still supported a minimum wage hike, and 
exemptions for farmers from monetary corrections.99  Cardoso’s constitutional reform 
agenda for privatization, tax system reform, administrative reform, political institution 
reform, and social security reform had a bleak outlook against the overwhelming 
legislative patronage obstacle. 
In realizing the potential for bitter defeats on all agenda items, Cardoso shifted his 
coalitional approach and went on the attack.  He attacked both the conservative elites 
who were protected as well as his political strength from the left—accusing them of 
‘stupidity’—gaining again popular momentum confronting special interests on both sides 
of the spectrum on behalf of the people.100  In light of the difficulties, Cardoso succeeded 
in June of 1995 when the Brazilian congress voted to partially liberalize the state oil 
monopoly, Petrobras, although its powerful unions were deeply involved in other parts of 
the economy and presented a formidable obstacle.101  This decision came on the heels of 
the Real Plan, and was implemented only six months after Cardoso’s inauguration.   
Cardoso had successfully implemented a constitutional reform extending 
the single term limit for presidency into two terms.  This successful reform to the 
institutional framework was ideally argued to allow Cardoso a longer period of time to 
complete his economic reform agenda.  Again, creditability from easing inflation and 
other social programs legitimized his constitutional reform.  However, hindsight has 
scholars make the point that he wasted his political momentum and resources on this 
amendment which could have been allocated to his economic agenda.  After the fiscal 
crisis that started with the Mexican default and suspending foreign capital, as contagion 
spreading throughout the region, Cardoso spent much of his political capital 
implementing emergency strategies to protect what progress he had made, and not on 
continuing with reforms. 
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Unfortunately the success of Cardoso’s first term was no guarantee for the success 
of his second term in office, which to say the least, was disappointing.  Following the 
currency devaluation in 1999, after the real to dollar peg was replaced by a floating 
exchange rate, Cardoso’s administration concentrated on retaining the reforms made 
during the first term, all but abandoning any further reforms.  “For example, no progress 
was made to liberalize labor markets, to reform the tax system, to modernize the 
judiciary, or to continue with the civil service reforms that had been initiated.”102  
As for Cardoso’s social agenda, he successfully amended the constitution 
earmarking more funds proportional to student enrollment.  However, compromise in 
passing the legislation through congress ‘axed’ any reform to middle-class subsidization 
of higher education, which is important when “80 percent of the education budget is 
spent on Federal universities that accounts for only 22 percent of overall university 
enrollment.”103  The rest of Cardoso’s social agenda received mixed support from 
congress, and the only true success was the constitutional amendment on education and 
two bills that bolster taxation on unproductive land and accelerate land expropriation. 
In the end Fernando Henrique Cardoso successfully implemented reforms in key 
industries like oil, energy, and telecommunications; as well as good governance reforms 
for presidential term extensions and educational revenue reform.  However, he failed to 
fix the tax system, social security, and civil service.  
Table 2 itemizes free-market policies enacted under Cardoso’s administration. 
Specific policies are extracted from secondary sources written by Albert Fishlow, 
Riordan Roett, and Ted Goertzel.  Table 2 also includes this author’s explanation on the 
affects of the reforms and a numerical guide that addresses specific area(s) of each reform 
delineated by John Williamson, in his “Washington Consensus” article, ten categories, or 
“policy instruments,” that constitute neoliberal ideals.  Williamson’s ten areas of policy 
reform as the criteria of successful market-oriented reforms: (1) fiscal discipline, (2) 
public expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) financial liberalization, (5) exchange 
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rates, (6) trade liberalization, (7) foreign direct investment, (8) privatization, (9) 
deregulation, (10) property rights.104   
 
Neoliberal Reform Affects “Washington 
Consensus” 
1995: Brazilian oil monopoly, Petrobas, is 
partially privatized 
An increased efficiency and 
competitiveness.  The 
existing institutions (over 
powering labor unions) are 
being impacted by a 
successful and powerful 
president.  
8,9 
1996: state tax on exports eliminated A new view of importance 
toward foreign trade. 
3,6 
1996: Curriculum and level definitions reformed 
in primary and secondary schools 
Educational reforms better 
prepare the children for 
future developments and 
progress. 
1,2 
1997: civil service reform, an increase in taxes, a 
budget cut, and a constitutional amendment 
granting the federal government permission retain 
a portion of revenues 
This reform was in reaction 
to the Asian financial crisis, 
stabilizing the economy 
1,2,3,4 
1996: constitutional term limits In theory would have 
afforded Cardoso more time 
to continue reforms 
 
1996: telecommunication privatization Allowed foreign investment 
and removed the state from 
control 
8 
Reforms were delineated from Riordan Roett, Albert Fishlow.  Authors interpretation 
Table 2. Reforms Under Fernando Henrique Cardoso  
 
D.  ANALYSIS 
As Laucher points out, economic stabilization reforms rely on the leader’s ability 
to design an appropriate agenda that “fits the nature and quantity of available political 
support;” or the institutional framework.  The institutional framework takes into account 
the preferences and interest of actors and how they group together.  Procedures and 
norms for conducting policy reform affected Cardoso’s ability to implement his reform 
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agenda, while his preferences constrained possible continued indexation of prices and 
wage. 
The political costs of maintaining the indexation polices outweighed the minimal 
benefits to the middle class, who wanted complete protection, but by the Collor 
administration, there was no class unaffected by the economic instability.  Politically, 
neoliberal reforms rested on two classes of individuals, the poor and businesses.105  The 
indexation of the past solidified the middle class and unions’ preferences for nothing less 
than state guarantees of protection.  The political elite also benefited from inflation and 
kickbacks from those protected by the heterodox policies.  The poor and businesses, on 
the other hand, stood to gain more through a stable economy. 
Cardoso had realized this, although however important his alignment to social 
programs, he appreciated the efficiency and effectiveness of an open market, fiscal 
discipline, and export led development.  Cardoso advocated neoliberal reforms, which is 
different from other left-of-center presidents.  He was influenced by the continual failure 
of heterodox policy and by his knowledge of Marxism, which believes socialism occurs 
only after capitalism fails, and not before.  As an educator he published many works for 
communist periodicals as well as extensive literature on the dependency theory.  
However, at the end of the day, Cardoso was pragmatic with his policy preferences, and 
the answer to Brazil’s economic fiscal crisis was not default or state intervention but 
policy reforms toward market liberalization and good governance. 
Cardoso’s first term started out with minimal success until the second anniversary 
of the Real Plan, when it was realized that despite the continued low level of inflation, 
Cardoso had failed to complete his constitutional reform agenda.  Legislative clientelism 
and patronage, weak and ineffective political parties, and politician autonomy created too 
large an obstacle for Cardoso to completely overcome.  He successfully implemented 
reforms in key industries like oil, energy, and telecommunications.  The rest of his 
administration’s tenure was spent protecting his reforms and protecting Brazil from 
international economic crises. 
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Lula will have a similar balancing act, because lessons learned prove neoliberal 
reforms provide economic stability and international investment.  But the institutional 
framework that Cardoso faced still exists, with an exception.  Lula faces two additional 
institutional factors that Cardoso did not.  First, the IMF pressure, which once supported 
Cardoso, will now try to coerce Lula to continue fiscal discipline and neoliberal reforms.  
Secondly, Lula’s ideological accountability is to the PT, which Cardoso escaped.  Lula 
may have to toe the party-line until he is free of the re-election candidacy.  As it stands 
now, Lula has disapproved a minimum wage hike—as Cardoso did—and has reassured 
the IMF and the international community of its intent to honor its debts, a positive 























Democratically elected presidents are rational actors who seek to maximize their 
power, influence, popularity, and legacy.  Unless an election is looming, presidents set 
their political agendas on their preferences and interests.  Left-wing presidents in Latin 
America are allied closely to socialists and communists whose economic preferences are 
state-centric.  However, presidents who are left-of-center possess the ability to implement 
successful neoliberal economic reforms, which are characterized in this thesis as those 
reforms represented by the “Washington Consensus.”  Two scenarios exist where left-of-
center presidents will implement free-market reforms. 
The first scenario is when the left-of-center president does not have interests or 
preference toward liberalism but is overwhelmed by institutions that are.  Lack of 
neoliberal preferences could either be politically economic loyalty to the left or low 
agenda priority due to other more pressing issues (for example, democratic transition, 
internal civil disruptions, etc.).  The president’s preferences are no less important to the 
state or this thesis; it needs to be clear that in a democracy the president’s agenda is not 
always final.  It depends on the institutions that exist.  Institutions that represent actors 
grouping their preference or political procedures and norms utilized make policies. 
The second scenario for a left-of-center president that successfully implements 
neoliberal reforms stems from their political agreement with the efficacy and 
effectiveness of neoliberal economic reforms.  This is labeled as the ‘pragmatic 
president’, whose preferences are dictated by the policy and benefits to the country, vice 
political loyalty.  The pragmatic president either politically prioritizes social concerns and 
issues over the party-line, or lacks party accountability and is autonomous to execute 
personal preferences.  Institutions in this case who are in favor of neoliberal reforms will 
support and collate their influence to support the president, and the opposition, whether 
from the left or right, will create obstacles to force concessions or abandonment of issues. 
Neoliberal economic reforms (policy outcomes) result from actors aggregating 
their preferences, and rationally seeking those interests in an institutional framework as 
long as the benefits outweigh the cost involved in the process.  Costs that deter an actor 
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from seeking interest could be political or literally resource dependent.  Every actor 
makes a cost-benefit analysis, rationally maximizing its utility.  A congressman may 
receive more utility by compromising on an issue, saving his resources for a higher-
priority item. 
The United States is deeply invested throughout the world and the scholarship on 
globalization is extensive, which does not bear repeating.  However, the U.S. economy 
and investors become directly impacted by the elections of presidents in the developing 
countries.  These countries lack the deepened institutions that developed countries do, 
making them and their trade relations vulnerable to political change.  This vulnerability is 
even more sensitive when a left-of-center politician is elected into office.  Developing 
countries predominantly require additional democratic consolidation and economic 
liberalization, and the election of a left-wing radical could undermine progress made.  
Progress that had already suffered transitional costs and those social classes would be 
impacted again when reverted.  It is in the best interest of the developing country and the 
United States that orthodox economic policies continue. 
Fragile democracies and the intricately woven web of markets emphasize political 
concern when a developing country elects a communist, socialist, or politically left 
president.  This thesis demonstrates that you can’t judge a crop by its weeds.  The 
institutions feed and nurture policy outcomes with their preferences and procedures.  The 
importance of this thesis was to encourage a detailed examination of the institutions of a 
developing country that has recently elected a potential threat to neoliberal progress.  
Assumption and judgments must be made for politicians to act, but research and follow-
through with institutional details will reveal the true nature of a country’s political 
economy.  This thesis used Chile under President Patricio Aylwin and Brazil under 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso as examples. 
President Aylwin succeeded General Pinochet by popular election, democratically 
overthrowing the military regime.  The unification of the political parties opposed to 
Pinochet had successfully nominated the victor, and created a new institution of a two-
party environment.  The Concertacion was politically left-of-center, absorbing the 
communists and socialists with the Christian Democratic Party.  However, a rigid 
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constitution and remnants of the military regime existed: a disproportional congress, 
General Pinochet remained commander of the armed forces, and human rights violations 
by the military were overlooked.  Amid all these distractions, Aylwin’s preferences were 
fixing the social issues of inequality, poverty, justice for human rights violations, and 
economic stability.  These social programs and interests encountered immense 
institutional barriers, and resulted in degraded power and influence on policy outcomes.  
This exemplifies the first scenario, when the president is led to neoliberal reforms instead 
of them being part of their agenda. 
Most literature published on Chile’s economic success overshadows President 
Aylwin’s free-market reforms with the successful reforms of General Pinochet’s 
authoritarian rule and his team of economists, the “Chicago Boys.”  However, Aylwin’s 
administration promulgated free-market reforms in an environment of distraction, 
democratic barriers, and transitional baggage.  Policy reforms included tax reforms, 
privatization of industries, tariff reduction, and deepening of institutions that support 
democracy. 
While Aylwin was an example of institutions overwhelming his political 
alignment on the issue of market reforms, President Fernando Cardoso is the example of 
the ‘pragmatic president.”  Cardoso was an educator and avid socialist before entering 
politics.  He wrote and published works for communist journals and books highlighting 
the repressive ways of capitalism, and how it benefited the few at the expense of the 
many.  But Brazilian economic failures with heterodox economic policies, and the 
understanding that socialism is found on the other end of capitalism and not achieved by 
social revolution, led Cardoso to become an advocate of neoliberal reforms. 
Cardoso took office on the momentum of an economic program that fixed the 
Brazilian hyperinflationary environment.  However, some institutions arranged for 
political elites and labor unions to benefit from an inflationary economy.  Cardoso’s 
economic reform agenda encountered significant opposition by institutions of patronage 
and clientelism in the legislature and among the state governors.   Cardoso was able to 
successfully navigate the treacherous institution, achieving policy reforms in the state-
monopolized oil industry and in public expenditures toward schools. 
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Cardoso was unable to continue economic stabilization reforms, despite being 
elected to a second term.  Economic crises in Asia and the fiscal defaults within its region 
forced Cardoso to spend more political capital on retaining the reforms already in place. 
Fernando Cardoso succeeded in leading Brazil toward a more open market, but 
institutions prevented completion of consolidating neoliberal policies.  Brazil remains 
well behind its neighbors in economic liberalization. 
Economic institutionalism methodology requires the researcher to delve into 
details.  Within these institutional details lies the ability to confidently predict policy 
outcomes.  This methodological research should be continued on developing countries 
with democracies, either for historical explanation or in present political contexts.  Case 
studies can be further discriminated by democracies requiring consolidation, or have 
fragile institutions, because in this globalized economic environment the most turbulent 
democracies tend to cause the most disruption in market balances.  Theoretically, rational 
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